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In a crisis, do employers place the burden of adjustment 
disproportionately on female employees? Relying on 
household and labor force data, existing studies of the 
distributional impact of crises have not been able to 
address this question. This paper uses Indonesia’s census 
of manufacturing firms to analyze employer responses 
and to identify mechanisms by which gender differences 
in impact may arise, notably differential treatment of 
men and women within firms as well as gender sorting 
across firms that varied in their exposure to the crisis. 
This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group; and the Chief Economist’s 
Office, Financial and Private Sector Development Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide 
open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at  mhallward@
worldbank.org.  
On average, women experienced higher job losses than 
their male colleagues within the same firm. However, 
the aggregate adverse effect of such differential treatment 
was more than offset by women being disproportionately 
employed in firms hit relatively less hard by the crisis. The 
null hypothesis that there were no gender differences in 
wage adjustment is not rejected. Analyzing how employer 
characteristics impact labor market adjustment patterns 
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Using  firm  level  data,  this  paper  brings  a  new  perspective  to  the  question  of  who  is 
vulnerable in volatile times. By focusing on gender differences in labor market impacts of crises, it 
illustrates how firm level data can benefit our understanding of who is at risk of losing their job and 
why. Existing studies that examine the distributional impact of crises almost exclusively rely on labor 
force and household level data, and consequently focus on labor supply.  However, crisis induced 
changes in labor market outcomes are predominantly driven by changes in labor demand; labor 
supply responses are typically muted compared to the large contractions in labor demand that are a 
defining feature of crises (McKenzie, 2004; Thomas et al., 2002). In addition, micro-level studies of 
the  distributional  consequences  of  crises  typically  document  significant  heterogeneity  in  impact 
across broad sectors, yet fail to explore how such heterogeneity arises (see e.g. Fallon and Lucas, 
2002).  Moreover, they are not able to distinguish between different mechanisms that might explain 
why some workers are more vulnerable than others. 
This paper helps redress these lacunae in the literature by examining how variations in firm 
responses  during  the  East  Asian  crisis  in  Indonesia  affected  men‘s  and  women‘s  relative 
employment vulnerability. It distinguishes between two previously unexplored mechanisms by which 
gender difference in impact might arise: differences in vulnerability could be the result of (i)  sorting 
by gender into firms and occupations that differ in their vulnerability to crises, and/or of (ii) of 
differential treatment of men and women workers within firms.      
That  employers  often  treat  men  and  women  differently  in  the  workplace  is  widely 
documented (see Altonji and Blank, 1999 for a review of the literature), and there is no shortage of 
rhetoric asserting that women are disproportionately at risk during volatile times (Grown, 2009; 
ILO, 2009; World Bank, 2009).
2  A common concern is that women get dismissed first and hired last 
(Oxfam, 2009, Seguino, 2009 and UNGEI, 2009).  However, the limited empirical evidence on the 
labor market consequences of macroeconomic crisis is distinctly ambiguous as to whether women or 
men were more vulnerable (Houseman and Abraham, 1993, Lim 2000, Thomas et al., 2002), begging 
the question as to whether claims regarding women‘s vulnerability may be exaggerated.  
Moreover, many of the assertions about women‘s relative vulnerability are predicated on the 
idea that employers discriminate against women. While we cannot prove or disprove the existence of 
                                                           
2  See  for  example  IFPRI,  2008;  ILO,  2009;  UNDP  2009;  and  World  Bank,  2009;  for  discussions  of  the  gender 
implications of the recent food, fuel and financial crises. 3 
 
employer discrimination with our data, distinguishing between sorting and differential treatment 
helps assess the likely magnitude of employer discrimination. In the sorting channel, the role of 
gender is indirect. It could influence how men and women select into different firms, but is unlikely 
to explain the variation in the impact of the crisis across sectors, firms and occupations. Thus, if 
differences in impact are driven by heterogeneity in impact of the crisis across firms that differ in the 
gender composition of their workforce (sorting), then the likely role of discrimination is limited.  By 
contrast, differential treatment is more direct; at issue is whether, confronted with a need to adjust, 
firms fired women first or cut their wages more. Concerns of discrimination are more pertinent if 
gender differences in impact are predominantly due to differential treatment.
 3   
Distinguishing between sorting and differential treatment is particularly important since the 
effects of these mechanisms could offset each other, resulting in an underestimation of gender 
differences in impact in aggregate statistics. This could happen, for example, if women were working 
in large firms that were more resilient to the crisis, yet such firms were more likely to fire women. 
Indeed, this paper will demonstrate that when favorable sorting effects dominate, aggregate statistics 
can obscure unfavorable differential treatment.  
Sorting and differential treatment are not only relevant for examining employment effects, 
they  could  also  explain  gender  differences  in  wage  adjustment.    Sorting  across  firms  and  by 
occupation could affect whether women tend to face wage or labor adjustment. The extent to which 
an employer will respond by cutting wages rather than jobs is likely to be affected by the employer‘s 
characteristics, e.g. large firms and foreign owned firms tend to pay higher wages and may thus have 
greater flexibility to adjust wages than small firms already paying minimum wages (or even lower 
wages).  There may also be differential treatment in wage adjustment within firms.  If women are 
willing to accept greater wage cuts than men, there could also be a gender specific wage-employment 
tradeoff that may render their employment less vulnerable than men‘s. To our knowledge, this is the 
first paper to examine the wage-employment trade-off during a crisis and the only paper thus far to 
consider gender-differences in this trade-off.  
The 1997-98 crisis in Indonesia provides a very relevant context to explore these issues. As 
in many other countries, gender norms in Indonesia prioritize men‘s employment over women‘s 
                                                           
3 Differential treatment need not necessarily reflect discrimination per se since we cannot control fully for workers‘ 
individual characteristics. Conversely, in the presence of unobserved worker heterogeneity, it is theoretically possible, 
although unlikely, to have discrimination in the absence of observed differential treatment. In this paper, we control for 
time-invariant heterogeneity, which should capture the lion‘s share of unobserved differences between men and women. 
Moreover, we control for differences due to occupation and a wide range of firm characteristics.   4 
 
(World Value Surveys, 1981-2009). Moreover, identification of firm responses is facilitated by the 
unexpected and ―quasi-experimental‖ nature of the crisis and its severity, the high flexibility of 
Indonesian  labor  markets  at  the  inception  of  the  crisis,  and  the  richness  of  the  Indonesian 
manufacturing  census  dataset  that  not  only  provides  detailed  information  on  employer 
characteristics,  but  also  gender  disaggregated  employment  information  by  broad  occupational 
categories (e.g white- and blue-collar workers).  
 The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  reviews  the  related  literature  and 
provides background information on the Indonesian crisis.  The data are discussed in Section 3, 
which  also  provides  a  static  overview  of  sorting  patterns  by  gender  and  a  bird‘s  eye  view  of 
employment and wage adjustment during the crisis. Section 4 assesses sorting effects by examining 
whether firms that employed proportionately more women were more likely to exit and by analyzing 
how,  among  continuing  firms,  employment  growth  was  correlated  with  the  initial  gender 
composition of the workforce. Next, Section 5 examines the evidence for differential treatment by 
assessing  whether  women  were  proportionately more  likely  to  be  fired  than  men  in  firms  that 
adjusted the size of their workforce.  It not only assesses whether men and women were treated 
differently  at  the  firm-level,  but  also  whether  the  crisis  led  to  a  change  in  such  discriminatory 
practices/differential  treatment  of  men  and  women  within  firms.
4  We  therefore  test  how 
employment adjustment and wage setting during the crisis differed from non -crisis periods. Section 
6 examines the evolution of the gender wage  differences to assess whether  women suffered more 
severe wage cuts than men, and the extent to which there is gender -specificity in employment-wage 
tradeoffs. Conclusions are presented in Section 7. 
The appendix validates our firm-level analysis with an analysis of the evolution of wages and 
employment using data on manufacturing employees from SAKERNAS, a nationally representative 
labor force survey in Indonesia. We cannot tell from this labor force survey the characteristics of the 
employer, but the   labor force data enable us to control for individual characteristics   and the 
comparison with the firm-level data highlights the extent to which the patterns for the larger formal 
manufacturing sector were mirrored in the broader population of manufacturing workers. 
                                                           
4 For example, if women are always more likely to be laid off when a firm is forced to downsize, one might also expect 
them  to  be  more  likely  to  be  laid  off  in  times  of  crisis.  Alternatively,  it  could  be  the  case  that  women  are  only 
discriminated against during times of extreme economic stress, but not in less turbulent times. An interesting question in 
this regard is whether women suffer disproportionately during the crisis relative to other times. We address this by 
examining how differential treatment during the crisis differed from differential treatment during non-crisis times. 5 
 
Our main results can be summarized as follows: Gender differences arose both because of 
sorting and differential treatment and these worked in opposite directions for blue-collar workers 
but  not  for  white-collar  workers.  Overall,  sorting  dominated  –  and  was  favorable  to  women‘s 
employment.  Even though on average 46% of all manufacturing jobs were held by women over the 
period studied, women‘s net job losses accounted for only a third of all the jobs lost during the 
crisis. However, we find heterogeneity across occupations and types of firms.  Blue-collar women 
suffered  from  unfavorable  differential  treatment  in  hiring  and  firing.  By  contrast,  white  collar 
women were more likely to retain their jobs than their male counterparts in such firms. While, the 
results show a large gender gap in wages, as well as substantial adjustment of wages during the crisis, 
there was little change in the wage gender gap during the crisis. These patterns are also mirrored in 
the labor force data analyzed in the appendix. 
2 Previous Literature and Context 
 
2.1  Related Literature 
This study brings together and builds on two strands of literature that have evolved quite 
separately up until this point.
 While a large body of literature has examined gender differences in the 
labor market outcomes of crises and shocks, focusing especially on the supply side by concentrating 
on households and individuals,
5 few such studies have analyzed the role of employers. Conversely, 
the relatively small  literature on firms‘ adjustment during crises has not explored whether firms‘ 
responses result in gender differences in wage and employment outcomes.
  
The  literature  on  differences  in  men‘s  and  women‘s  employment  outcomes  due  to 
macroeconomic shocks has typically focused on changes brought on by either large-scale structural 
policy regime shifts (i.e., trade, privatization or financial liberalization) or by macroeconomic crises.
 6  
                                                           
5 A broader literature has explored the question of whether women bear the brunt of coping with economic shocks (see 
inter alia, Sen and Grown, 1987) and has yielded conflicting results; in some instances women and girls suffer more 
severe welfare effects than men and boys in terms of health and nutrition (see, for example, Behrman, 1998; and Dercon 
and Krishnan, 2002); in other instances, there are no gender differences in health and education outcomes (Levine and 
Ames, 2003) or in household income (Cunningham and Maloney, 2000); occasionally, men suffer more than women. 
For example,  male headed households  suffered larger income losses due to macroeconomic shocks in Peru 1980s 
(Glewwe and Hall; 1998). 
6 By examining how gender equity is affected by an economic crisis the paper also contributes to the growing literature 
on the relationship between gender equity and economic development (see e.g., Mammen and Paxson, 2000). While this 
literature has focused extensively on the link between growth and gender equity (see e.g., Klasen and Lamanna, 1998), it 
is not known whether gains in gender equity are wiped out during a crisis.  For example, it is not  known whether crises 
inflate or reduce preexistent gender pay differences. 6 
 
Starting with the former, trade policy has been shown to have a substantial gender impact because of 
sorting by gender into exporting and non-exporting firms (Wood, 1991; Fontana and Wood, 2000; 
Ozler,  2000).
7  Rama  (2002)  considers  the  impact  on  women‘s  employment  and  wages  of  a 
downsizing of state-owned enterprises in Vietnam using simulations based on the Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey and finds evidence for initial shedding of female workers (relative to men), but a 
reduction  in  gender  pay  gaps.  Secondly,  studies  on  gender  differences  resulting  from 
macroeconomic crises have yielded conflicting conclusions about the responses of female workers 
relative to those of male workers (see e.g. Thomas et al., 2002).  
Macroeconomic  shocks  have  profound  impacts  on  job  flows  and  wages.    Studies  of 
manufacturing  firms  suggest  that  downturns  due  to  business  cycle  fluctuations  are  typically 
associated with excess churning of firms and workers (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Davis et al., 
1996). Gallego and Tessada (2009) use sectoral panel data on job flows to examine the employment 
impact of sudden stops in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico and find that crises are associated 
with lower job creation and increased job destruction and that these effects are heterogeneous across 
sectors and countries.  Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers (2010) show that in the case of Indonesia, 
the East Asian crisis was particularly destructive, of firms and jobs, with the usual correlation of 
productivity and survival breaking down during the crisis. 
However, very few studies examine heterogeneity in impact by gender. We are aware of only 
two papers that look at gender differences in job creation and destruction focusing on firm-level 
employment  dynamics.  Houseman  and  Abraham  (1993)  examine  differences  in  employment 
responses of men and women to changes in output in U.S. and Japanese manufacturing from 1970-
1990. Although their study does not explicitly focus on employment adjustment in response to 
financial crises, their findings suggest that, relative to men, women bore a disproportionate amount 
of the burden of the labor adjustment to the oil crises of the 1970s.  The second is Lim (2000), who 
examines employment patterns in the Philippines during the East Asian crisis and finds that male 
employment, having increased relatively faster in the lead up to the crisis then fell relatively more 
during the crisis. Yet these studies neither focus on both wage and employment adjustment nor 
distinguish between differential treatment and sorting. 
A handful of studies have examined firm level employment and wage adjustment in the 
context of transition from state-controlled towards market-oriented economies (see Christev and 
                                                           
7 It is worth noting, however that Kucera and Milberg (2000) examined the impact of trade expansion on women during 
a subsequent period, notably from 1978 until 1995, and did not find the same effect. 7 
 
Fitzroy,  2002, Basu et al. 1997, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003) and in the context of trade 
liberalization (Revenga, 1997).  However, the analyses are not disaggregated by gender and do not 
encompass a crisis period. 
 
2.2 Context: The Indonesian Crisis 
 
In the early 1990s Indonesia was at the height of an extended period of industrialization with 
manufacturing being an important engine of growth. (Dwor-Frecault et al. 1999). In the wake of the 
devaluation of the Thai Baht in July 1997, flows of foreign capital reversed drastically and the rupiah 
depreciated dramatically. Interest rates were raised to defend the currency, which exacerbated the 
decline in demand. Inflation rates, which had been 12%, shot up to close to 100% (Hill, 1999). GDP 
contracted severely in 1997, and fell by over 13% in 1998. Manufacturing output followed a similar 
pattern,  though  manufacturing  growth  had  already  suffered  a  mild  dip  in  1996.  The  drop  in 
manufacturing output was large relative to the corresponding dip in GDP. Manufacturing, a sector 
with 46 percent women employees at the inception of the crisis, was one of the hardest hit sectors, 
making it an interesting case study to examine how employer responses to shocks affected men and 
women differently.   
Estimates  based  on  SAKERNAS  indicate  the  spike  in  inflation  facilitated  real  wage 
adjustment by reducing the relevance of nominal wage rigidities and minimum wages.  Across the 
earnings distribution, both men and women experienced real wage cuts on the order of 40%.  Yet 
the  changes  in  total  employment  rates  were  relatively  small:  between  1997  and  1998,  female 
employment in urban areas declined by 0.7% and male employment declined by 2.2% (Thomas et al. 
2002).  Labor force participation rates increased slightly more for women (1.5%) than men (1.4%) 
(see also Cameron, 2000).
8 Thus, the impact of the crisis on  aggregate employment was muted 
(Fallon and Lucas, 2002).
9 Thomas et al. (2002) conclude that ―the evidence suggests that short-run 
labor supply functions are fairly inelastic in Indonesia‖ (p. 177).  If this is true, then a reduced form 
                                                           
8 By contrast, their estimates based on the Indonesian Family Life Survey, a rotating panel of households, suggest that 
women‘s employment rates went up slightly, primarily because many women started working as unpaid family workers. 
9 The aggregate figures masks reallocation of employment across sectors, including a reversal of rural-urban migration 
patterns and an increase in informality. Both the industrial distribution of jobs shifted and patterns of job creation 
altered substantially: while manufacturing, construction and retail sectors had been growing rapidly in the lead-up to the 
crisis, that trend was reversed once it had begun.  8 
 
approach to modeling relative employment changes will predominantly be identifying demand rather 
than supply effects.  
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1 Data and Construction of Key Explanatory Variables 
 
The Indonesian Manufacturing Census (Statistik Industri, or SI) contains longitudinal data on 
all  Indonesian  manufacturing  establishments  with  more  than  20  employees  from  1993-2004.  A 
number of features of this dataset render it very suitable for analyzing employer responses to crisis.
10  
To start with, a major strength of the data is that it disaggregates  firm-level employment into blue 
and white collar workers by gender.  Thus, we can analyze the impact of the East Asian crisis on the 
employment prospects of men and women, allowing for further differentiation by the broad types of 
jobs held by men and women.  Second  and related, the data enable us to study  within-firm gender 
differences in employment controlling for crude occupational category (i.e. differentiating between 
white and blue-collar workers). Third, by virtue of being a census the data allow us to assess to what 
extent job losses are driven by exit and reduced entry, and to what extent they are the result of 
employment adjustment by incumbents. Fourth, the data contain information on the wage-bill for 
blue- and white-collar workers separately. Following Amiti and Cameron (2007) and Harrison and 
Scorse (2009), we use this information to construct proxies for firm-level average wages for blue-and 
white collar workers by dividing those wage bills  by number of blue- and white-collar workers 
respectively. Although these firm-level wage data are not gender-disaggregated, they help us assess 
gender differences in wage adjustment: following Hellerstein and Neumark (1995, 1999) we focus on 
the relationship between an establishment‘s average wage in an occupation and the share of female 
employees in that occupation.
11  Last but not least, the SI data contain information on a rich number 
of firm characteristics such as their sector, material input usage, output, capital stock,
12  ownership 
structure and whether or not they export (see appendix A for more details).  
                                                           
10 The census treats establishments (plants) rather than firms as their units of interest.  Less than 5% of establishments in 
the census are owned by multi-plant firms (see Blalock and Gertler 2004 for a thorough discussion).  
11 Ideally one would control for individual characteristics in testing for differential treatment effects. This information is 
not available, but we do include firm-level proxies for productivity and wages.  
12 Information on the capital stock was not recorded in 1996 and missing for some firms in other years. Concerns about 
possible selection biases have led us not to control for  capital per worker in our regressions. The qualitative pattern of 9 
 
Although it is rare to have data that both contain detailed information on firms and the 
workers they employ and are as comprehensive in coverage over the span of a crisis period, some 
limitations of the SI data should be kept in mind. First, the census only includes firms with 20 or 
more  employees  and  is  consequently  not  representative  of  the  entire  manufacturing  sector. 
Moreover, ‗entry‘ is defined as entry into the survey, which happens when a new establishment with 
20 or more employees is started or when a pre-existing establishment passes this threshold. Similarly, 
‗exit‘ could be due to firm closure or dropping below the threshold.  Any temporary lapses in 
reporting are not counted as exits.
13  Second, only net changes in employment at the firm-level are 
observed. This could understate the total amount of churning that takes place. Moreover, we do not 
know whether a reduction in firm size is accompanied by forced layoffs or achieved by natural 
attrition, that is, whether workers leav e voluntary or involuntary.   A related concern is that t he 
definition of the employment variable changed slightly in 2001, with unpaid workers no longer being 
reported separately. However, the number of such workers had not been large, and t he results are 
robust to excluding the period 2001-2004.
14  Moreover, our occupational categorization of workers 
in to blue-and white collar categories is crude and we may consequently fail to document subtler 
gender differences occurring at finer levels of aggregation. 
In addition, the data do not contain information on individuals . For example, we have no 
information  on  the  number  of  hours  they  work ,  their  age,  their  tenure  and  experience. 
Consequently, changes on the intensive margin cannot be identified and it is not possible to control 
for workers‘ observed and unobserved personal characteristics. 
  Appendix B presents supporting evidence on the evolution of employment and wages in 
the  broader  manufacturing  sector  based  on  repeated  representative  cross-sectional  labor  force 
surveys, the SAKERNAS data. This analysis corroborates the results presented below and, suggests 
that in manufacturing, gender differences in crisis induced adjustment in hours worked were small.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
results, however, is robust to doing so, regardless of whether we impute the capital stock for all observations for which it 
is missing or whether we only use observations for which information on the capital stock is available. These results are 
omitted to conserve space, but available from the authors upon request.    
13 To examine the sensitivity of our results to the 20-person cut-off, we re-estimated the regressions presented in this 
paper using a 30, 50 and 100 -people cutoff instead. The resulting pattern of results did not change qualitatively. Our 
results do not appear to be driven by the exclusion of firms with fewer than 20 employees. Results are not presented to 
conserve space, but are available from the authors upon request.  
14 These results are omitted to conserve space, but available from the authors upon request. 10 
 
3.2 Sorting Patterns: Where Do Women Work? 
Figures  1A-F  plot  kernel  weighted  polynomial  bivariate  regressions  of  the  gender 
composition  on  firm-size,  capital  intensity,  value-added  per  worker,  wages  and  share  of  output 
exported, to document sorting patterns by gender.  They reveal a very strong association between 
firm-size and the share of women in the workforce; small firms tend to be majority-male firms, 
while large firms tend to be majority female-firms. In part because they tend to be larger, firms that 
employ a larger proportion of women are also more likely to export.  Yet, the share of women in the 
workforce is negatively correlated with capital intensity, value-added per worker and firm average 
wages, variables that are positively correlated with firm-size.  Firms that use proportionately more 
blue-collar workers also employ proportionately more women (see figure 1F). The coexistence of 
these patterns points towards the importance of sorting by gender into different types of industries 
and firms. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by industry, ranking them on the basis of the share of 
women they employ. Industries which are highly labor-intensive pay relatively low wages and have a 
high export propensity,  such as the  tobacco  and apparel  industry, employ  a lot of women. By 
contrast, capital intensive industries, such as transport and motor vehicles, basic machinery and 
equipment employ relatively few women. These patterns are by no means unique to Indonesia; very 
similar gender sorting patterns have been documented in a host of other countries (see e.g. World 
Bank forthcoming, Chapter 5 and the references therein). Possible explanations for these sorting 
patterns are that women have a comparative advantage in industries that require fine motor skills, 
women may be less likely to be involved in labor disputes which can be a particular concern in large 
firms, and that women may lack more favorable outside opportunities (relative to men).
15  
  Given the sorting of women into larger firms,  we will prese nt  weighted regressions. 
Unweighted statistics reflect average outcomes for firms,  while weighted statistics reflect outcomes 
for workers, better capturing average outcomes for women.
16  While women represent 46 percent of 
blue-collar workers in manufacturing, only about a third of all white -collar workers are women . 
                                                           
15 For example, according to study of manufacturing firms in Bangladesh (Paul Majumder and Begum, 2000, p3) ― women 
sort into garment firms because a) women are more patient and nimble; (b) women are more controllable than men; (c) women are less mobile 
and less likely to join a trade union; and (d) women can do better in sewing because this job coincides with their traditional jobs. Most of the 
garment employers interviewed, reported that benefits arising from these qualities amply compensate the cost of employment of women in terms 
of maternity leave, high absenteeism, and other factors”. 
16  The  results  obtained  using  unweighted  regressions  are  in  general  very  similar  to  those  obtained  using  weighted 
regressions. An interesting difference in weighted and unweighted pertains to differential treatment, the evidence for 
which is somewhat stronger in unweighted regressions. This suggests that differential treatment is more prevalent in 
small firms.  Results are not presented to conserve space, but available from the authors upon request. 11 
 
However,  white-collar  workers  account  for  no  more  than  15%  of  all  manufacturing  workers. 
Whereas the female share of blue-collar workers varies from 11 percent in motor vehicles to 72 
percent in tobacco, there is much less variation in the share of women in white collar jobs across 
industries.  
  White-collar workers are typically better educated than blue-collar workers (see also Lipsey 
and Sjoholm, 2004 and Harrison and Scorse, 2009). Gender differences in education vary within 
occupation:  Male  blue-collar  workers  are  on  average  slightly  better  educated  than  female  ones, 
whereas female white-collar workers tend to be somewhat better educated than male white-collar 
workers.  
3.3 A Bird’s Eye View of Aggregate Adjustment Patterns 
 
3.3.1 Employment Adjustment 
Following Dunne et al. (1989), figures 2 present descriptive statistics on job flows separately 
by gender, with figure 2A documenting patterns for blue-collar workers and figure 2B documenting 
job flows of white collar workers.  For both groups of workers, all measures of job flows become 
smaller in magnitude over time; both excess reallocation and net job creation diminished over time, 
consistent with declining labor market flexibility over time due to more stringent labor regulation.
17 
The crisis is associated with a large drop in manufac turing employment opportunities with white-
collar workers suffering more severe job losses than blue-collar workers. Women seem to have fared 
slightly better in both occupational categories .  While the  difference in  employment adjustment 
between men and women  is small relative to total men and women employed,  it is a substantial 
proportion of the total adjustment undertaken.  With women representing 46% of the workers, they 
only suffered 34% of the net employment losses.
18 Thus the small gender differences in employment 
impact are in part attributable to men being more lik ely to be having white-collar jobs (sorting by 
occupation) and such jobs being more likely to be destroyed, and in part due to proportionately 
smaller reductions in the number of female jobs lost relative to men in both occupations.
19   
                                                           
17 After the fall of Suharto, policy priorities shifted, with greater labor protections put into place (see World Bank, 2010), 
Hallward-Driemeier et al. 2010b. 
18 These differences are also substantial in terms of the number of people affected; A one percentage adjustment in the 
number of jobs for men (women) amounts to roughly fifteen thousand jobs.   
19 Also note that the crisis led to a spike in excess churning driven by a simultaneous increase in job destruction and a 
decrease in job creation. Nonetheless, the fact that, even during the crisis,  overall job creation rates were as high as 
13.8% in 1997 and 16.3% in 1998 is indicative of high heterogeneity in firm performance. 12 
 
Figures  3A  and  3B  further  distinguish  between  job  creation  and  destruction  due  to 
adjustment by incumbents, exit and entry of new firms, separately for blue- and white-collar workers 
respectively. Gender differences are largely driven by job destruction by incumbents, which were 
most severe for men and account for the bulk of the decline in net job creation. Overall then, these 
findings  suggest  that  while  employment  adjustment  patterns  for  men  and  women  look  broadly 
similar, women fared better.
20  
 
3.3.2  Wage Adjustment 
Figures 4A and 4B plot the evolution of firm-level average wage growth for blue-collar and 
white-collar workers. To assess how wage adjustment varied with the gender composition of the 
workforce, separate plots are drawn for firms where women comprise less than one third (male 
dominated), one to two thirds (gender neutral) and more than two thirds (female dominated) of the 
workers.  For comparison, plot 5C depicts the evolution of inflation. Clearly, the spike in inflation 
that  was  precipitated  by  the  devaluation  of  the  Rupiah  eroded  real  firm-average  wages  which 
declined by 22% for blue-collar workers in 1998 and by 28% for white-collar workers on average 
(see figures 4A and 4B).  White-collar workers thus suffered both larger employment losses and 
larger wage cuts. After the crisis, real wage growth resumed.  Consistent with the macroeconomic 
trends described in Section 2, firms coped with the crisis both by cutting employment and reducing 
real wages.  
Plots 4A and 4B show that average firm wage adjustment was not very strongly correlated 
with the gender composition either for blue-collar or white-collar workers. However, the averages 
presented here mask significant heterogeneity within and between firms. The next three sections 
analyze this heterogeneity in more depth. 
4  Sorting 
 
At this juncture it is useful to provide a roadmap of the micro-analysis that lies ahead. 
Section four assess the importance of sorting in employment adjustment by analyzing the relation 
                                                           
20 In interpreting these findings it is important to bear in mind that we do not have any information whether or not 
separations were voluntary.  For example, we cannot rule out the possibility that men who left manufacturing did so 
because  they  were  able  to  take  up  more  lucrative  income  earnings  opportunities.  However,  this  scenario  seems 
somewhat in plausible in view of the fact that earnings declines were widespread and not confined to the initially 
affected sectors (Fallon and Lucas, 2002).  13 
 
between the gender composition of the workforce and firm-survival (section 4.1) and employment 
growth of continuing firms (4.2). Gender patterns could well differ between survival and growth, 
particularly if women are predominantly in larger firms that are more likely to survive, but then grow 
slower on average.  Section 5 then turns to the question of differential treatment.  Changes in wages 
are then examined in Section 6. 
4.1  Firm Survival 
 
Figure 5A tracks the evolution of entry and exit rates while Figure 5B plots how the gender 
composition of the workforce of exiting firms evolved over time.  The crisis is clearly associated 
with a spike in exit rates.
21 Moreover, the average share of female workers in exiting firms  dropped 
slightly during the crisis, consistent with the figures presented in Section 3.   
 
4.1.1  Econometric Framework 
To model firm survival, a discrete-time proportional hazards survival model is used, which is 
estimated by means of logistic regression.
22 Following Cox (1972) we assume that the hazard rate , 
        of a firm characterized by covariates   , is proportional to a baseline hazard     
         
                    
               <=>                                       
               
This  choice  of  the  hazard  function  implies  that  each  regression  coefficient       measures  the 
proportionate change in hazards associated with absolute changes in the corresponding covariate 
        .  For example, if the share of women is not correlated with an increased risk of exit then 
      , and        (      ) is associated with an increased likelihood of exit (survival).  
                                                           
21 There is another spike in exit in 2000, which is most probably driven, at least in part, by changes in survey design (see 
the Appendix for a discussion of this issue). 
22 In discrete time, the survival function          which measures the probability that for a firm i with a vector of 
characteristics, X, survival time, T, is at least   , can be expressed as the product of the complements of period specific 
hazard rates:                                             
    . The         refer to the period specific hazard rates, 
which measure the conditional probability of exiting at time    conditional on surviving until time      and are defined as 
                                                
      
        
      
      , where        is the cumulative density function of 
time at risk given the vector of characteristics   . 14 
 
   To examine how the determinants of firm-survival varied during the crisis, these explanatory 
variables are interacted with  a dummy for the crisis period. Adding an error term      yields the 
estimable equation: 
(1)                               
                
                       
       +      
where Crisis is a dummy variable for 1997 and 1998. If                     (< 0), then the likelihood 
of exit increases (decreases) in absolute terms with the share of women employed during the crisis – 
ceteris paribus. The crisis interaction thus helps us assess whether firms employing more women 
were more likely to exit during the crisis relative to other periods. This testing strategy is very general 




Table 3 present the results of our survival analysis and presents four specifications. The basic 
specification  presented  in  column  1  only  includes  controls  for  the  gender  composition  of  the 
workforce whereas the second specification, which is presented in column 2, includes additional 
controls  for  a  rich  set  of  firm  characteristics  including  firm  size,  the  skills  composition  of  the 
workforce (proxied by the ―unskilled ratio‖), whether or not the firm exports, firm age, foreign as 
well as government ownership and productivity, proxied by value added per worker, and sector-year 
dummies, which not only control for sectoral differences but also for sector-specific time-varying 
shocks.  The first specification captures unconditional gender differences, while the second column 
documents to what extent gender differences are due to gender per se and to what extent they are 
the  result  of  differences  in  firm  characteristics  correlated  with  the  gender  composition  of  the 
workforce.  A  comparison  of  the  results  from  the  two  columns  is  thus  revealing  about  the 
importance  of  sorting.  Columns  3  and  4  replicate  these  specifications,  but  allowing  for  gender 
differences by occupation instead of the total gender composition of the workforce. 
The first two specifications demonstrate the importance of sorting.  The baseline specification 
reveals that during non-crisis times the relationship between firm exit and the gender composition of 
the  workforce  is  significant  and  negative,  and  that  during  the  crisis  this  association  becomes 
significantly more negative;  during the crisis women were thus much less likely to lose their jobs due 
to firm exit. The second specification shows that this is entirely a sorting effect; once other firm 
characteristics are accounted for, both the coefficient on the gender composition of the workforce 15 
 
and its interaction with the crisis become insignificant. The regression furthermore confirms that 
white collar workers were hit harder; the coefficient on the interaction term between the crisis and 
the unskilled is significantly negative, suggesting that employing proportionally more white-collar 
workers is associated with a heightened exit propensity. 
 The third and fourth columns decompose the gender effects by broad occupational category 
and show that the relatively favorable sorting effect for women during the crisis is confined to blue-
collar workers only; they are significantly less likely to lose their jobs during crises ceteris paribus, 
whereas white collar women were not less exposed than white-collar men.
23 Note, however, that 
during non-crisis times, women in white collar jobs are at a marginally lower risk of losing their jobs 
once we condition on the gender and occupational composition of the workforce, as is evidenced by 
the negative coefficient on the proportion of white collar workers that are women.
24  
Overall, these findings highlight the importance of sorting; gender differences in employment 
losses due to firm exit are driven by sorting into firms   and occupations  that  differed in their 
vulnerability to the crisis.    
4.2 Firm Growth 
 
Figures 6A and 6B plot bivariate, locally-weighted polynomial regressions of the change in 
the log of the number of blue- and white-collar workers, respectively, on the gender composition of 
the workforce in the prior period, both during the crisis and during non-crisis years. Firms on 
average shed labor during the crisis, as the crisis lines lie substantially below the non-crisis lines in 
both plots. That white-collar workers were hit much harder by the crisis than blue-collar workers is 
evident when one notes the different scaling of the axes of the two figures.  
Employment growth of blue-collar workers (Figure 6A) is very mildly negatively correlated 
with the share of women in the workforce during non-crisis years and not correlated with the gender 
composition  during  crisis  years.  Figure  6B  provides  evidence  that  the  relationship  between  the 
proportion  of  female  white-collar  workers  and  the  change  in  the  total  number  of  white-collar 
                                                           
23 The interaction term for the female share of white collar jobs and the crisis is only marginally insignificant – and 
positive.  Together it would offset the average benefit that a higher share of female white collar employees had on the 
probability of exit.  As such, the evidence points to female white collar employees sorting into firms that were somewhat 
more vulnerable during the crisis. 
24 Note, however, that the ―unskilled ratio‖, which is positively correlated with the share of women in firms white and 
blue collar‘ workforces, is also significantly positively correlated with firm exit. 16 
 
workers  is  not  linear.  Nevertheless,  firms  with  a  higher  share  of  female  white-collar  workers 
generally grow slightly faster.   
 
4.2.1 Econometric Strategy 
To model labor demand we follow Svejnar and Basu (1997) and start from the general 
model:                 where labor usage of firm i is a function of firm output, Y, wages, W,  and 
other  firm  characteristics  O.  This  conceptualization  of  labor  demand  corresponds  to  a  cost 
minimization framework in which enterprises set employment in response to exogenously given 
demand and input and output prices.  To allow for the fact that adjustment is not instantaneous due 
to the presence of adjustment costs we introduce lags of both labor usage as well as the principal 
explanatory variables. Writing the model in log-linear form and adding an error term yields the 
estimable equation.  
 
     
                                                                                           
        
 
As  pointed  out  by  Basu  et  al.  (2005)  this  specification  nests  a  number  of  different 
specifications, including i) a completely static model (                                   , ii) a 
partial adjustment model (                           ,  and iii) a first-difference fixed effect mode 
(                                                        . 
While our aim is to provide descriptive evidence, the above labor demand model can be 
derived from an underlying optimization framework; as shown by Nickell (1987), the specification is 
the solution to a cost-minimization problem of a firm with a Cobb-Douglas production function 
that faces exogenous output constraints and quadratic adjustment costs in labor and capital. Thus, 
the specification has a structural interpretation. 
Since we are interested in examining the impact of the crisis and whether or not firms that 
employed  more  women  experienced  proportionately  more  employment  losses,  we  interact  the 
explanatory variables with a crisis dummy. In addition, following Christev and Fritzroy (2002) we 
impose the constraint that           to avoid multicollinearity and separate firm characteristics into 
the gender composition of the workforce, f , and other firm characteristics X. To examine whether 
or not workers in firms that employ more women are more likely to be laid off, we thus estimate the 17 
 
change in labor demand, separately for blue-collar and for white-collar workers, using the following 





                                                                                                      
                                                                                     
                 +                                         +                                      
    +                                                +                                   
                    
 
If firms that employ proportionately more women grow faster (slower) than those that do 
not, then              (<  0).    The  coefficient  on  the  interaction                   tells  us  whether 
employment losses for these firms were larger in the crisis relative to other periods. The ―absolute‖ 
adjustment during the crisis is given by       +             . 
A number of econometric issues have to be addressed. First, to minimize the role of outliers 
we use the ―Haltiwanger growth measure‖, i.e. the change in employment over the average firm-size 
for two periods: H = (Lt -Lt-1 )/[0.5*(Lt + Lt-1)], thus bounding the growth rate between -2 and +2. 
Second, serial correlation in the error term in conjunction with the presence of lagged size as a 
regressor will cause OLS estimates of equation 2 to be biased. Fixed-effects estimates, too, will be 
biased because the transformed residual is by construction correlated with the transformed lagged 
dependent variable, the Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981), but in the opposite direction. Comparison of 
OLS and FE estimates will thus provide us with a confidence interval within which we expect the 




Table 4 presents regressions of growth in the employment of blue- and white-collar workers 
within surviving and new firms. We first focus on blue-collar workers as they account for the bulk of 
manufacturing  employment.  The  basic  specifications  are  presented  in  columns  1  and  2,  with 
additional firm controls added in columns 3 and 4.  Columns 1 and 3 provide the OLS results, with 
columns 2 and 4 the FE specifications. 
                                                           
25 In principle this endogeneity issue could be tackled by using GMM methods, however, the difference GMM estimator 
suffers from weak instrument bias if the underlying series are highly persistent—as is the case with the employment 
series under consideration. While the Systems GMM estimator could, in principle, remedy this problem, the additional 
moment conditions it invokes rely crucially on a mean stationarity assumption, which is a particularly unappealing 
assumption in the context of a crisis (see Roodman, 2006 for a discussion). We therefore eschew this approach. 18 
 
   The association between the gender composition of the workforce and labor growth is not 
significant in the OLS specification, but is significant in the FE and negative.  It implies moving 
from  having  no  women  to  exclusively  employing  women  would  reduce  the  estimated  average 
growth rate by up to 4.2% (column 2).  The crisis did lead to a statistically significant change in this 
association, with the interaction term having a significant positive coefficient; during the crisis firms 
with more women employees grew relatively faster (or shrank less rapidly).  The effect is similar for 
both the OLS and FE regressions. 
Columns 3  and 4  again  demonstrate  the  importance  of taking sorting  across firms into 
account.  In these regressions, the full set of firm characteristics is included, as are their interactions 
with the crisis dummy.  The coefficient on the share of female workers is significantly associated 
with employment growth, but the sign has now flipped and is positive.  Controlling for these firm 
characteristics, a greater share of female employees is associated with higher employment growth – 
with the effect significantly larger and still positive during the crisis.  The overall magnitudes of the 
effects  are  similar  between  columns  3  and  4,  with  the  crisis  effect  somewhat  larger  in  the  FE 
specification.  In understanding the change in sign of the coefficient on the gender share, controlling 
for firm size is of particular importance.  Underlying the negative unconditional correlation between 
the proportion of women and firm growth is that women are more likely to work in larger firms, 
which tend to grow less quickly than small firms.   
The results on other firm characteristics generally accord with intuition: firms which paid 
higher wages last period and firms that increased wages, grow less quickly. This is consistent with 
the existence of a trade-off between wage and employment growth. Interestingly, during the crisis 
these associations are even stronger, hinting at the possibility of a stronger trade-off between wage 
and  employment  adjustment.  Of  course,  one  has  to  bear  in  mind  that  wages  are  potentially 
endogenous.
26 In addition, exporters were less likely to shed  blue-collar workers during the crisis, 
presumably because they benefited from favorable exchange rate movements.  
  In Table 4, columns 5 -8  present the results for white-collar workers. The most striking 
finding is that employment growth of white -collar workers is always positively correlated with the 
share of female white-collar workers, but the crisis interaction term is never significant at the 5% 
level, though it is negative and significant at the 10% level  in both the OLS and FE specifications 
                                                           
26 Since the firm level average wage is a composite of men‘s and women‘s wages, these specifications also go a long way 
towards controlling for potential differences in employment growth due to possible gender differences in willingness to 
absorb real wage reductions, as these should be reflected in firm-level average wage changes. 19 
 
that include a full set of controls.  The size of the coefficients on the gender share do fall in columns 
7 and 8; sorting helps explain some of the favorable association with female white collar workers. 
 In  summary,  the  gender  composition  of  the  workforce  is  correlated  with  growth  in 
employment.  For  blue-collar  workers  the  proportion  of  women  in  the  workforce  becomes  less 
negative – and even turns positive – as we include firm controls, attesting to the importance of 
sorting.  Our results are furthermore consistent with the existence of a(n exacerbated) tradeoff 
between wage and employment adjustment. 
 
5  Differential Treatment    
Figures 7A and 7B plot the change in the share of women against total labor growth of the 
relevant category of workers for both blue- and white-collar workers, separately for both the crisis 
and non-crisis periods.  The  mild  positive association between  an increase  in  the  proportion  of 
female blue-collar workers in the firm and growth in the number of blue-collar workers suggests that 
as firms expand their blue-collar workforce they hire proportionately more women (consistent with 
figure 1A). However, proportionately more women are laid off when they contract. In other words, 
women‘s  employment  appears  more  pro-cyclical  than  men‘s  employment.  The  figures  do  not 
suggest that this relationship was distinctly different during the crisis.  
For white-collar workers, these relationships are slightly different. Figure 7B portrays a very 
small  negative  correlation  between  changes  in  the  number  of  white-collar  workers  and  the 
proportion  of  white-collar  workers  who  are  women  during  non-crisis  times.  Again,  the  crisis 
association does not seem markedly different from the association observed in less volatile times.  
While the plots are striking as the observed unconditional correlations are small, the magnitude of 
the  overall  effects  of  differential  treatment  could  be  larger  given  the  increased  changes  in 
employment during the crisis.  
 
5.1 Econometric Approach 
 
To assess whether men and women with the same occupation are treated differently within 
the same firm, the change in the proportion of women in firm i‗s  workforce is regressed on the total 
amount of labor adjustment that firm i undertakes and a set of explanatory variables. The most 20 
 
general specification distinguishes between positive and negative changes in total employment and 
interacts all explanatory variables with a crisis dummy:    
               
 




   
            
 
 
               
 
 
             +                                                  
  Where the + and – indicate positive and negative employment changes respectively, thus 
enabling us to test for potential asymmetries between net hiring and firing, and     is a random error 




The results for blue-collar workers are presented in Table 5, columns 1-4. All specifications 
examine the impact of changes in the number of blue-collar workers (measured in logs), entered 
separately as either expansion (or no growth) and contraction, and their interactions with a crisis 
dummy.  Overall, the regressions demonstrate that growth in the number of blue-collar workers is 
correlated with a small increase in the share of women, while a contraction is associated with a 
symmetric  reduction in  the proportion  of women.    This finding is consistent with the  positive 
association between firm-size and the share of blue-collar workers that are women documented in 
Section 3. The crisis did not induce a change in these relationships relative to other periods, except 
in the case of the FE specification with firm controls, where the effect was doubled during the crisis. 
As  average  employment growth  was  negative  during  the  crisis,  female  blue-collar  workers  thus 
suffered comparatively larger employment losses as a result of differential treatment than male blue-
collar workers did.  However, it should be kept in mind that the magnitude of these effects are very 
small; increasing (reducing) the number of blue-collar workers by 10% is associated with a 0.07% 
increase (decrease) in the share of blue-collar workers that are women.
27  
The results for white-collar workers are also reported in Table 5, in columns 5-8. They reveal 
a negative association between growth in the number of  white-collar workers and the share of 
female  white-collar  workers.    The finding  is robust to controlling for the full set of controls  
(columns 7 and 8) .  This is consistent with Figure 1A; except for th e very largest firms, the 
association between size and the share of female  white-collar workers trends downwards.  When 
                                                           
27  If  these  specifications  are  run  unweighted,  the  associations  between  changes  in  size  and  changes  in  the  gender 
composition gain significance, suggesting that changes in the gender composition of the workforce associated with 
changes in firm-size are largest in small firms. 21 
 
firms expand the number of white-collar workers, they are likely to hire proportionately more men 
(relative to the prevailing gender composition of the white-collar workforce). Yet, when they reduce 
the number of white-collar workers, women are more likely to preserve their jobs (in relative terms).  
During the crisis, the impact of differential treatment in expanding firms is significantly muted, such 
that women would be less disadvantaged.  For contracting firms, the crisis serves to reinforce the 
pattern that women would be more advantaged, although the magnitude of this crisis effect is small 
(and not always significant). Thus the effect of the crisis on female white collar workers was less 
harmful on average than the effect on their male colleagues. 
In summary, there is some evidence for differential treatment.  Intriguingly, the impact of 
differential treatment varied by occupation. Firms that contracted their blue-collar workforce fired 
proportionately  more  women,  while  firms  that  reduced  their  white-collar  workforce  fired 
proportionately more men. These effects were then reinforced during the crisis.  Only the effect of 
expanding  firms  hiring  fewer  white  collar  men  was  muted  during  the  crisis.    One  possible 
explanation for these findings is that firms were more likely to retain their most skilled employees, 
which, in the case of blue-collar workers were men, and in the case of white-collar workers were 
women. However, the magnitude of these differential treatment effects is small. 
 
6 What Happened to Relative Wages? The Evolution of Gender Pay 
Differences 
 
6.1 Econometric Approach 
 
The comparatively favorable employment consequences of the crisis for women might be 
due  to  a  change  in  the  relative  price  of  female  labor  versus  male  labor.  Following  Amiti  and 
Cameron (2007) and Harrison and Scorse (2010) we regress the logarithm of these firm-level average 
wages by occupational category,          , on the share of women,         , and a vector of firm 
characteristics,     .  We  also  interact  these  explanatory  variables  with  a  crisis  dummy  to  assess 
whether and if so, how, wage setting during the crisis differed from normal times. That is, we 
estimate regressions of the form:
28 
 
                                                           
28 Dynamic wage equations that model wage-growth as a function of the gender composition of the workforce and other 
firm characteristics yield very similar results and are available from the authors upon request.  22 
 
                                                                                                            
 
where    is a time invariant and unobserved firm-specific fixed effect and     is an error 
term that is assumed to have zero mean and finite variance. A correlation between    and any of the 
regressors can cause OLS estimates to be biased. Our preferred estimator is therefore the Fixed 
Effects  estimator;  wage  adjustment  is  identified  on  the  basis  of  within-firm  changes,  and  any 
potential bias due to unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics is removed.  The coefficient on 
the share of women,    measures the differences in pay between men and women, conditional on 
observable firm characteristics as captured in       and can be considered a crude proxy for the 
gender pay gap (see Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999)
 29  under the assumption that workers of the 
same gender and with the same occupation earn the same wages.
30 To see this note that increasing 
the proportion of women from 0 to 1 would  increase estimated log firm average wages by    , or 
approximately   . 
   
6.2 Results 
 
   Results are presented  in Table  6.  Again  we  compare the  extent to which  unconditional 
gender pay differences are associated with gender, per se, and to what extent they are accounted for 
by other factors.  Columns 1 and 2 present our baseline specifications which only control for the 
gender composition of the workforce and thus provide insight into average unconditional gender 
differences,  while  columns  3  and  4  add  a  full  set  of  explanatory  variables,  including  firm-size, 
ownership dummies, value-added per worker, firm age, whether or not the firm exports, sector-year 
dummies, as well as measure of real minimum wages. The share of women is strongly negatively 
correlated with firm-level average wages, which is indicative of gender-pay differences (column 1). 
Controlling  for  firm-fixed  effects  reduces  gender  pay  differences  in  half  (column  2).    Adding 
additional firm controls
3132 further reduces the pay gap. Both these results demonstrate that men sort 
                                                           
29 It has to be interpreted with caution since we cannot identify changes in the earnings distribution within firms and lack 
controls for time-varying and time-invariant characteristics of the workforce such as education and hours worked. 
30 The empirical specifications below relax this assumption by including province, region and sector-yeardummies, as 
well as controls for a rich set of firm characteriscs. 
31 These results are robust to controlling for capital per worker and controlling for p roductivity using measures of TFP 
rather than value -added per worker. Using these controls leads to a substantial reduction in sample size since 
information on capital is missing for a large number of firms and missing altogether in 1996  – which is why we prefer 23 
 
into higher paying firms (column 3). Nonetheless, the fact that the gender premium is robust to 
controlling for time-invariant characteristics suggest that gender pay differences are not exclusively 
driven by sorting (column 4).  Also note that the Fixed Effects and OLS estimates become very 
similar. 
The  crisis  does  not  have  a  significant  impact  on  gender  pay  differentials,  regardless  of 
whether we control for firm characteristics and/or firm-fixed effects.  Thus, on average, women 
blue-collar workers did not experience larger or smaller wage losses than men in the crisis.  
Results for white-collar workers are presented in columns 5-8 and again provide evidence for 
gender pay differentials favoring men, which are in large part due to sorting.
33  Crucially, the crisis 
does not significantly impact gender pay differences for white -collar workers either. In summary,  
wage losses were severe, but gender differences in wage adjustment were statistically negligible for 
both blue- and white-collar workers.  
 
7  Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined whether and to what extent firm responses to the East Asian crisis 
affected  men  and  women‘s  manufacturing  employment  and  wages  differently.  Adjustment  took 
place via a reduction in employment as well as a drastic decline in real wages, facilitated by high 
inflation.  Gender differences in the impact of the crisis on manufacturing employment were small 
in absolute terms but substantial relative to the total amount of adjustment undertaken. Women‘s 
employment was less affected than men‘s employment, but women did not suffer larger wage cuts, 
even though our regressions suggest that the wage-employment tradeoff became more acute during 
the crisis.  
The comparatively favorable employment consequences for women were predominantly due 
to sorting  by gender  into firms that  were  less vulnerable  to the  crisis. Most saliently, women‘s 
employment was concentrated in larger firms and firms that export. Such firms exhibited lower net 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
specifications that exclude capital and use value-added per worker as our proxy for productivity. Nonetheless, results are 
available from the authors upon request, but omitted to conserve space.   
32 Size is positively correlated with average firm -level wages in the OLS specifications while the impact of size in the 
fixed effects regressions is negative, perhaps because of measurement error (recall that the average wage variables is 
computed by dividing the total wage bill by the total number of employees).  
33 The OLS estimate of the unconditional gender wage gap is large and statistically significant; women white-collar 
workers on average earn 22% less than male white-collar workers.  The FE regression shows the opposite pattern; that 
within firms a higher share of women white collar workers is associated with higher wages. Adding firm controls affects 
the results; The OLS coefficient remains significant but is again much smaller.  In the FE regression there is now no 
effect; the unconditional effect can be explained by sorting rather than by the gender composition per se.   24 
 
employment losses. Although they were less likely to grow conditional on survival, larger firms were 
more likely to survive, such that, in net terms, larger firms shed less labor. Part of the sorting by 
gender also occurred along occupational lines.
3435 That is, men also suffered more because they were 
more likely to be working in white-collar jobs, which were more vulnerable.  
Differential treatment effects varied by occupation as well as firm size, and are obscured in 
aggregate statistics, which reflect the combined effect of sorting and differential treatment . When 
firms contracted, the share of blue-collar workers that were female decreased somewhat, while the 
share of white-collar workers that were female increased. For blue-collar workers, these relationships 
were slightly exacerbated during the crisis, such that women were more likely to suffer job losses 
than their male colleagues within the same firms. By contrast, differential treatment protected white 
collar women relative  to their male colleagues. The  crisis mildly (but not consistently statistically 
significantly) reinforced the pattern that women  in white collar jobs are more likely to be  spared 
when firms contract. Moreover, they benefitted significantly more from firm expansion than during 
non-crisis times.   However, these differential treatment effects were very small. That is , even with 
evidence of differential treatment, the claims about crises inducing a vast   surge in employer 
discrimination discussed in the introduction appear grossly exaggerated; if discrimination was really 
driving women‘s vulnerability, one would have expected to see much more dramatic differences. 
This paper has documented heterogeneity in the relative importance of these channels across 
different types of firms and workers in different occupations.  It has, moreover, demonstrated how 
aggregate statistics may mask countervailing transmission channels. Examining to what extent this is 
the  case  using  matched  employer-employee  data,  and  assessing  to  what  extent  our  findings 
generalize to other sectors and other crises, are promising areas for further research. Overall, this 
paper underscores the importance of analyzing and documenting heterogeneity in firms‘ adjustment 
to major macroeconomic shocks in understanding the distributional impacts of crises. 
 
                                                           
34 However, white-collar workers comprise only a small share of all manufacturing employment, such that aggregate 
gender differences in crisis impact associated with sorting into different occupations are small.   
35 We also examined whether or not the fact that white -collar workers were hit harder by the crisis was due to within -
firm adjustment in the occupational structure of the workforce (for example, one might speculate that firms  have a 
proclivity to fire disproportionately more white-collar workers when they are confronted with a shock) but did not find 
any evidence that this was the case. Results are omitted to conserve space but available from the authors upon request. 25 
 
Bibliography 
Ackerberg, D., Caves, K. and Frazer, G. (2005). ―Structural identification of production functions‖ 
UCLA Mimeo. 
Altonji, J. and Blank, R. (1999). ―Race and Gender in the Labor Market.‖ pp.3143-3181, in eds. O. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card. Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3. Elsevier Science, B.V: Amsterdam. 
Aswicahyono, H.  (2008). ―A Survey of Micro-data Analyses in Indonesia.‖ Ch. 12 in eds. J. Corbett and 
S. Umezaki Deepening East Asian Economic Integration, ERIA Research Project Report No. 1. Economic 
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia. Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Basu, S., Estrin, S.  and Svejnar, J. (1997). ―Employment and wage behaviour of industrial enterprises in 
transition economies: The cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia.‖ Economics of Transition. vol. 5(2), pp. 
271-288. 
Behrman, J. (1998). "Intrahousehold Allocation of Nutrients in Rural India: Are Boys Favored? Do 
Parents Exhibit Inequality Aversion?" Oxford Economic Papers vol. 40(1), pp. 32-54. 
Blalock, G. and Gertler, P.(2004). ―Learning from exporting revisited in a less developed setting.‖ Journal 
of Development Economics, vol. 75, pp. 397-416. 
Blalock, G., Gertler, P. and Levine, D. (2008). ―Financial constraints on investment in an emerging 
market crisis.‖ Journal of Monetary Economics. vol. 55, pp. 568–591. 
Cameron, L. (2000). ―Women and the Labour Market During and After the Crisis.‖ pp.144-157 in eds. K. 
Robinson and S. Bessell, Women in Indonesia: Gender, Equity and Development  Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd.: 
Singapore. 
Christev, A, and FitzRoy, F. (2002). ―Employment and Wage Adjustment: Insider-Outsider Control in a 
Polish Privatization Panel Study‖, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 30(2), pp 251-275.   
Cox, R., (1972). ―Regression Models and Life Tables‖, Journal of the Royal Statistic Society, Vol. 34, pp. 187-
202. 
Christev, A. and F.R. Fritzroy (2002).  ―Employment and Wage Adjustment: Insider-Outsider Control in 
a Polish Privatization Panel Study. ‖ Journal of Comparative Economics. 30 (2), pp. 251-275. 
Cunningham, W. and Maloney, W. (2000).  ―Measuring Vulnerability: Who Suffered During the 1995 
Mexican Crisis?‖ Mimeo. 
Davis. S, and Haltiwanger, J. (1992). ―Gross job creation, gross job destruction and employment 
reallocation‖  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. CVII, pp. 819-63 
Davis, S., Haltiwanger, J. and Schuh, S. (1996). Job Creation and Destruction. Cambridge,  USA: MIT Press. 
Dercon, S. and Krishnan., P. (2000). ―In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural 
  Ethiopia.‖ Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108(4), pp. 688-727. 26 
 
Dwor-Frecault, D., Colaco, F. and Hallward-Driemeier, M. (1999). Asian Corporate Recovery.  World Bank: 
Washington DC.  
Dunne, T., Roberts, M.  and Samuelson, L. (1989). ―The Growth and Failure of U.S. Manufacturing 
Plants.‖  Quarterly Journal of Economics  vol. 104, pp. 671-98. 
Fallon,  P.  and  Lucas,  R.  (2002).  ―The  Impact  of  Financial  Crises  on  Labour  Markets,  Household 
Incomes, and Poverty: A Review of Evidence.‖  The World Bank Research Observer vol 17(1), pp. 21-43. 
Fontana, M. and Wood, A. (2000) ―Modeling the Effects of Trade on Women, at Work and at Home.‖ 
World Development. vol. 28(7), pp. 1173-1190. 
Gallego, F. and Tessada, J. (2009). ―Sudden Stops and Reallocation: Evidence from Job Flows in Latin 
America.‖ Mimeo. 
Glewwe, P. and Hall., G. (1998). ―Are some groups more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks than 
others? Hypothesis tests based on panel data from Peru.‖ Journal of Development Economics.  vol. 56(1), 
pp. 181-206.  
Grown, C. (2009). ―Gender Dimensions of the Economic/Financial Crisis.‖ African Development Bank 
Report. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Gender/Grown-Economic-Financial-Crisis.pdf 
Harrison, A. and Scorse., J. (2009). "Do foreign-owned firms pay more? Evidence from the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector," (with Jason Scorse), in Labor Markets and Economic Development (eds.) R. 
Kanbur and J. Svejnar, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York.  
Hallward-Driemeier, M., and Rijkers, B. (2010). ―Do Crises Catalyze Creative Destruction? Firm-Level 
Evidence from Indonesia.‖ Mimeo. 
Hallward-Driemeier, M., Rijkers, B.  and Waxman. A.. (2010). ―Can Minimum Wages Close the Gender 
Gap? Evidence from Indonesia.‖ Mimeo. 
Haltiwanger, J. and Vodopivec, M. (2003). ―Worker flows, job flows and firm wage policies: An analysis 
of Slovenia.‖ vol 11(2), pp.253-290. 
Hellerstein J. and  Neumark, D. (1995) ―Are Earnings Profiles Steeper Than Productivity Profiles? 
  Evidence from Israeli Firm-Level Data.‖ The Journal of Human Resources. 30(1), pp.  89-112. 
Hellerstein, J. and Neumark, D. (1999). ―Sex, Wages, and Productivity: An Empirical Analysis of Israeli 
Firm-Level Data.‖  International Economic Review. vol. 40(1), pp. 95-123. 
Hill, H. (1999). The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons. Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies: Singapore. 
Houseman, S. and Abraham., K. (1993) ―Female Workers as a Buffer in the Japanese Economy.‖ The 
American Economic Review.  Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association.vol. 83(2), pp. 45-51. 
IFPRI. (2008). ―Helping Women Respond to the Global Food Crisis.‖ IFPRI Policy Brief  7. International 
Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, DC.  27 
 
ILO. (2009). ―Gender equality at the heart of decent work.‖ Magazine World of Work 65, April 2009: 
ILO Gender Equality Campaign 2008–09: International Labour Organisation: Geneva. 
Klasen, S. and Lamanna, F.  (2009). ―The Impact of Gender Inequality in Education and Employment on 
Economic Growth: New Evidence for a Panel of Countries.‖ Feminist Economics, vol 15(3), pp. 91-
132.  
Kucera, D. and Milberg, W. (2000). Gender Segregation and Gender Bias in Manufacturing Trade 
Expansion: Revisiting the ‗Wood Asymmetry.‘‖ World Development, vol 28(7), pp.1191-1210. 
Levine, D. and Ames, M. (2003). ―Gender Bias and the Indonesian Financial Crisis: Were Girls Hit the 
Hardest?‖ CIDER Working Paper No, C03-130. University of California, Berkeley. 
Lim, J. (2000). ―The Effects of the East Asian Crisis on the Employment of Women and Men: The 
Philippine Case.‖ World Development,  vol. 28(7), pp.1285-1306. 
Lipsey, R. E. and Sjoholm, F. (2004). "Foreign direct investment, education and wages in Indonesian 
manufacturing," Journal of Development Economics. vol. 73(1), pp. 415-422. 
McKenzie, D. J. (2004). "Aggregate Shocks and Urban Labor Market Responses: Evidence from 
Argentina's Financial Crisis," Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 52(4), pp.719-58. 
Mammen, K. and Paxson, C. (2000). ―Women‘s Work and Economic Development.‖  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives,  vol. 14(4), pp.141-164. 
Nickell, S.J. (1987). "Dynamic models of labour demand," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. 
Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pp 
473-522 
Ozler, S. (2000). ―Export Orientation and Female Share of Employment: Evidence from Turkey.‖ World 
Development, vol. 28(7), pp.1239-1248. 
Oxfam. (2009). ―Paying the Price for the Economic Crisis.‖ Oxfam International Discussion Paper. 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/paying-the-price-for-global-economic-crisis.pdf, 
last accessed: 07/23/2010. 
Paul-Mazumdar, P., and A. Begum. (2000). ―The Gender Imbalances in the Export Oriented Garment 
Industry in Bangladesh.‖ Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, Working Paper 12.  
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Rama, M. (2002). ―The Gender Implications of Public Sector Downsizing: The Reform Program of 
Vietnam.‖ World Bank Research Observer. vol.17(2), pp.167-189. 
Revenga, A. (1997). ―Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization: The Case of Mexican 
Manufacturing.‖ Journal of Labor Economics. vol 3(2), S20-S43. 
Roodman, D. (2006). ―How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to ―Difference‖ and ―System‖ GMM in 
  Stata‖   Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 103.   
 28 
 
Seguino, S. (2009). ―The Global Economic Crisis, Its Gender Implications, and Policy Responses.‖  
Paper prepared for Gender Perspectives on the Financial Crisis Panel at the Fifty-Third Session of the 
Commission on the Status of Women, United Nations, March 5, 2009. 
Sen, G.,  and Grown, C. (1987). Development, crises and alternative visions: Third World women's perspectives. New 
York: Monthly Review Press. 
Thomas,  D., Smith, J.P., Beegle, K., Teruel, G., and Frankenberg, E. (2002). ―Wages, employment and 
  economic shocks: Evidence from Indonesia‖ Journal of Population Economics, vol. 15(1), pp.161-193. 
UNDP. (2009). Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development. United 
Nations Development Program. New York, NY. 
UNGEI (2009). ―The Gender Perspectives of the Global Crisis of 2008‖: 
http://www.ungei.org/infobycountry/247_2209.html. Last accessed: August 6, 2010. 
Van Reenen, J. and Bond, S.R. (2007). ―Microeconometric Methods of Investment and Employment.‖ in 
eds. J. Heckman and E. Leamer. Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 6(1), pp. 4417-4498. 
Wood, A. (1991) ―North-South Trade and Female Labor in Manufacturing: An Asymmetry‖ Development 
Studies, vol 27(2), pp. 168-189. 
World Bank. (2009) Global Monitoring Report 2009: A Development Emergency. World Bank: Washington, DC. 
World Bank (2010) Indonesia Jobs Report: Towards Better Jobs and Security for All.  World Bank. 
World Bank, forthcoming.  World Development Report 2012 Gender Equity  and Development.  World Bank:  
Washington, DC. 
World Values Surveys, (1981-2009); see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
 
   29 
 
Figures 1A-K: Bivariate relationships between key variables of interest (1993-2004) 
Share of women vs. Key firm characteristics 
F1A: Gender composition vs. Firm-size                              F1B: Gender Composition vs. Capital Intensity 
       
F1C: Gender composition vs. Value-added per Worker             F1D: Gender Composition vs. Output Exported 
        
F1E: Gender composition vs. Wages                         F1F: Gender composition vs. Unskilled Ratio 
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Figures 2A and 2B: Job Creation and Destruction, Net Job Creation, and Excess Churning (1994-
2004) 
 
 Figures 3A and 3B: Job Creation and Destruction: Incumbents, Exiters and Entrants (1994-2003) 
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Fig. 4A:  Wage adjustment blue-collar workers – SI data 
 
Fig.  4B:  Wage adjustment white-collar workers – SI data 
 
Fig.  4C:  The Evolution of Inflation 
 






















































































































Fig.  5A: Entry and Exit Rates 
 
 
Fig.  5B: Share of female workers in Entering and Exiting Firms
 
 
Figures 6A and 6B: Employment growth vs the gender composition of the workforce (1993-2004) 
Figure 6A: Blue-collar workers                   Figure 6B: White-collar workers       
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Figures 7A and 7B: Change in the gender composition of the workforce vs. emp. growth (1993-2004)  
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are  Women 
Share of blue-collar 
workers that are 
female 
Share of white-collar 
workers that are 
female 
Tobacco products  71.68%  75.43%  29.45% 
Apparel  60.95%  62.48%  45.23% 
Radio, television and communication equipment 
& medical instruments  50.04%  51.53%  38.30% 
Textiles  49.50%  50.80%  36.62% 
Leather  45.42%  45.37%  39.30% 
Food products and beverages  41.26%  42.01%  28.76% 
Recycling, rubber and plastics   38.07%  37.72%  35.45% 
Coke, petroleum & chemical products  34.78%  34.88%  31.35% 
Printing   31.51%  28.20%  41.34% 
Furniture  31.31%  30.25%  35.56% 
Paper products  30.96%  29.29%  35.01% 
Electrical machinery & office equipment  29.41%  27.82%  31.51% 
Other non-metallic mineral products  26.96%  26.22%  22.30% 
Wood   23.08%  21.96%  29.58% 
Basic metals & fabricated metal products, except 
machinery    19.24%  16.29%  31.13% 
Other transport equipment  14.77%  11.44%  31.69% 
Machinery and equipment  14.42%  10.63%  31.92% 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Firms  (N=157,495) 
Variable  Explanation  Mean  sd  Weighted 
Mean 
Share of female workers   
0.37  0.29  0.46 
%Women Blue Collar   Share of blue-collar workers who are female  0.37  0.32  0.47 
%Women White Collar   Share of white-collar workers who are female  0.33  0.27  0.33 
LogWblue  Log firm average blue-collar worker wage ‗000s 
Rupiah in 1993 prices  7.04  0.72  7.27 
LogWwhite   Log firm-average white-collar worker wage '000s 
Rupiah in 1993 prices  7.53  0.95  8.00 
LogL  Log total employment (blue-collar workers + 
white-collar workers)  4.06  1.19  5.99 
LogLblue  Log blue-collar workers  2.20  1.41  4.01 
LogLwhite  Log white-collar workers  4.27  1.16  6.20 
Log(firm age+1)    2.30  0.86  2.43 
Government owned   =1 if local or national government has owns any 
part of the company  0.03  0.16  0.06 
Foreign owned   (=1 if any for. ownership)  0.07  0.25  0.19 
Exporter   (=1 if any output exported)  0.18  0.38  0.40 
Unskilled Ratio   (= blue-collar workers/tot. emp.)  0.82  0.15  0.84 
Log(V/L)  = log (Real value-added per worker) 
8.09  1.14  8.60 
Log(K/L)  = log capital per worker measured as the deflated 
replacement value of machinery and equipment in 
‗000 rupiah in 1993 prices 
6.77  1.84  7.58 
Log Minimum Wage  =log  provincial level minimum wage  in ‗000 
rupiah in 1993 prices   6.92  0.25  6.93 
   36 
 
Table 3: Firm Exit (1993-2003) 
Firm Exit: 
Dependent Variable: Log hazard Ratio 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   “Baseline”  “Full Model”   “Baseline”  “Full Model” 





   coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se 
%Women Overall  -0.073*  0.032     
  (0.040)  (0.048)     
Crisis*%Women Overall  -0.324***  -0.065     
  (0.091)  (0.106)     
%Women Blue       -0.064  0.073 
      (0.040)  (0.047) 
Crisis*%Women Blue       -0.255***  0.050 
      (0.074)  (0.088) 
%Women White       -0.090*  -0.100** 
      (0.046)  (0.044) 
Crisis*%Women White      0.134  0.009 
      (0.082)  (0.079) 
Unskilled ratio     -0.235**  0.442***  -0.252*** 
    (0.092)  (0.090)  (0.093) 
Crisis*Unskilled ratio    0.052  -0.128  0.031 
    (0.166)  (0.160)  (0.170) 
LogL    -0.501***    -0.504*** 
    (0.016)    (0.016) 
Crisis*LogL    -0.069**    -0.074** 
    (0.030)    (0.031) 
Log(V/L)    -0.169***    -0.167*** 
    (0.014)    (0.014) 
Crisis*Log(V/L)    0.126***    0.132*** 
    (0.025)    (0.026) 
Firmage (log)    -0.131***    -0.131*** 
    (0.015)    (0.015) 
Crisis*Firmage(log)    -0.131***    -0.131*** 
    (0.026)    (0.026) 
Foreign Owned    0.192***    0.189*** 
    (0.065)    (0.065) 
Crisis*Foreign Owned    -0.265**    -0.269** 
    (0.125)    (0.125) 
Government Owned    0.214**    0.213** 
    (0.094)    (0.094) 
Crisis*Government Owned    -0.043    -0.035 
    (0.179)    (0.180) 
Exporter    0.199***    0.199*** 
    (0.039)    (0.039) 
Crisis*exporter    -0.334***    -0.338*** 
    (0.076)    (0.076) 
F-Test: Unskilled ratio+      5.55  9.76 
Crisis *Unskilled ratio=0      (p=0.02)  (p=0.00) 
F-Test: %Women Blue Collar      25.69  5.11 
+crisis%Women Blue Collar=0      (p=0.00)  (p=0.08) 
F-Test: %Women White Collar      0.42  7.08 
+crisis%Women White Collar=0      (p-0,52)  (p=0.03) 
Year dummies  X    X   
Sector*Year Dummies    X    X 
Province Dummies    X    X 
Number of observations  157,495  157,495  157,495  157,495 
Pseudo R2  0.024  0.069  0.024  0.069 




Table 4: Labor Growth (1993-2004) 
Labor growth 
  Blue-Collar Workers  White Collar Workers 
Dependent Variable  Haltiwanger Growth Blue-collar Workers  Haltiwanger Growth White-collar Workers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Haltiwanger  Growth  OLS  FE  OLS   FE  OLS  FE  OLS   FE 
H=(Lt -Lt-1 )/0.5(Lt +Lt-1)  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se 
%Women blue (t-1)   -0.000  -0.042***  0.021***  0.017**         
   (0.002)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.008)         
Crisis* %Women blue (t-1)  0.019***  0.018***  0.012*  0.018***         
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)         
%Women white (t-1)          0.040***  0.098***  0.035***  0.054*** 
          (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Crisis*%Women white (t-1)          -0.004  -0.005  -0.021*  -0.021* 
          (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
LogLblue(t-1)      -0.021***  -0.137***         
      (0.001)  (0.004)         
Crisis*LogLblue(t-1)      -0.005**  -0.009***         
      (0.002)  (0.003)         
 LogWblue      -0.033***  -0.036***         
       (0.002)  (0.002)         
Crisis* LogWblue      -0.015***  -0.012**         
       (0.006)  (0.005)         
LogWblue(t-1)      -0.012***  -0.027***         
       (0.001)  (0.002)         
Crisis*LogWblue (t-1)      -0.002  -0.000         
      (0.003)  (0.003)         
LogLwhite(t-1)              -0.025***  -0.097*** 
              (0.002)  (0.005) 
Crisis*LogLwhite(t-1)              -0.003  -0.007** 







 LogWwhite              -0.052***  -0.060*** 
               (0.002)  (0.003) 
Crisis* LogWwhite              -0.022***  -0.022*** 
               (0.006)  (0.006) 
LogWwhite(t-1)              -0.010***  -0.038*** 
               (0.001)  (0.003) 
Crisis*LogWwhite (t-1)              -0.004  -0.004 
              (0.003)  (0.003) 
 LogY      0.047***  0.046***      0.034***  0.033*** 
       (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.002)  (0.002) 
Crisis* LogY      0.013***  0.014***      0.010*  0.014** 
       (0.004)  (0.004)      (0.005)  (0.005) 
LogY (t-1)      0.015***  0.035***      0.017***  0.028*** 
       (0.001)  (0.002)      (0.001)  (0.002) 
Crisis*LogY (t-1)      0.000  0.002      0.000  0.003 
      (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.003)  (0.002) 
Foreign owned (t-1)      0.001  -0.002      -0.009***  -0.000 
       (0.002)  (0.005)      (0.003)  (0.007) 
Crisis* Foreign owned (t-1)      -0.000  -0.001      0.023***  0.021*** 
       (0.005)  (0.005)      (0.007)  (0.007) 
Government owned (t-1)      -0.007**  -0.011**      0.009*  -0.011 
       (0.003)  (0.006)      (0.005)  (0.008) 
Crisis* Government owned 
(t-1) 
    0.003  -0.001      0.022*  0.036*** 
       (0.008)  (0.009)      (0.011)  (0.010) 
Exporter (t-1)      0.002  0.004      0.001  0.002 
       (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.003)  (0.003) 
Crisis*exporter (t-1)      0.009**  0.004      0.001  -0.005 
       (0.004)  (0.004)      (0.006)  (0.006) 
Unskilled ratio (t-1)      -0.064***  -0.064***      0.045***  0.125*** 
       (0.007)  (0.015)      (0.008)  (0.023) 
Crisis*Unskilled ratio (t-1)      -0.024  -0.043***      0.034*  0.031* 
       (0.015)  (0.014)      (0.018)  (0.019) 
Firmage (log) (t-1)      -0.006***  -0.003      -0.004**  -0.008 
       (0.001)  (0.004)      (0.001)  (0.005) 
Crisis*Firmage (log) (t-1)      -0.004*  -0.001      0.004  0.002 
      (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.003)  (0.003) 
Year Dummies  X  X      X  X     
Sector-Year Dummies      X  X      X  X 
Province Dummies      X        X   
F-test: Gender-composition  13.76  5.04  34.51  12.91  9.30  35.70  1.74  6.18 
+crisis*gender composition=0  (p=0.00)  (p=0.03)  (p=0.00)  (p=0.00)  (p=0.00)  (p=0.00)  (p=0.19)  (p=0.01) 
Number of observations  124,536  124,536  124,536  124,536  124,536  124,536  124,536  124,536 
R2  0.009  0.022  0.124  0.248  0.006  0.013  0.130  0.217 
Adjusted R2  0.009  0.022  0.122  0.247  0.006  0.013  0.129  0.216 
Notes:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The Haltiwanger growth measure is defined as  H=(Lt -Lt-1 )/0.5(Lt +Lt-1) 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by establishment. 
The sample is restricted to firms for which the absolute change in employment was lower than 100%. 
OLS Weighted regressions use as weight the average number of blue-collar workers over the period over which the growth is defined, FE Weighted regressions use as 
weights the average number of blue-collar workers over the entire period 38 
 
Table 5: Differential treatment 
Differential Treatment 
  Blue-Collar Workers  White Collar Workers 
Dependent Variable 
Change in the share of blue-collar workers 
that are women 
Change in the share of white-collar workers 
that are women 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  OLS  FE  OLS   FE  OLS  FE  OLS   FE 
   coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se 
 LogLblue- positive   0.008**  0.008*  0.008**  0.007***         
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)         
 LogLblue - negative  0.009*  0.009  0.009*  0.009***         
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)         
Crisis* LogLblue-positive  0.007  0.006  0.008  0.007*         
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.003)         
Crisis* LogLblue -negative  -0.000  0.007  -0.001  0.007**         
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.003)         
 LogLwhite- positive           -0.040***  -0.043***  -0.041***  -0.044*** 
          (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
 LogLwhite- negative          -0.038***  -0.042***  -0.039***  -0.042*** 
          (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
Crisis* LogLwhite- positive          0.018*  0.018*  0.017*  0.018*** 
          (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
Crisis* LogLwhite-negative          -0.006  -0.010  -0.004  -0.008** 
          (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.003) 
Lblue (log) (t-1)      -0.001***  -0.003***         
      (0.000)  (0.001)         
crisis*Lblue (log) (t-1)      -0.000  -0.001         
      (0.001)  (0.000)         
Lwhite (log) (t-1)              -0.001*  -0.003*** 
              (0.000)  (0.001) 
crisis*Lwhite (log) (t-1)              -0.000  -0.000 
              (0.001)  (0.001) 
Foreign Owned(t-1)      0.001  0.001      0.001  0.001 
      (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.002)  (0.002) 
Crisis*Foreign Owned(t-1)      -0.001  0.001      0.001  0.000 
      (0.003)  (0.001)      (0.004)  (0.002) 
Government Owned(t-1)      0.001  -0.004**      -0.001  -0.001 
      (0.001)  (0.002)      (0.002)  (0.002) 
Crisis*Government (t-1)Owned      0.005  0.004      -0.005  -0.006*** 
      (0.003)  (0.002)      (0.005)  (0.002) 
Exporter(t-1)      0.001  0.001**      0.002*  0.002** 
      (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Crisis*exporter(t-1)      0.001  0.001      -0.004  -0.005*** 
      (0.002)  (0.001)      (0.003)  (0.001) 
Unskilled ratio (t-1)      0.008***  0.024***      -0.001  -0.017*** 
      (0.002)  (0.003)      (0.003)  (0.004) 
Crisis*Unskilled ratio(t-1)      -0.002  -0.005      -0.008  -0.008* 
      (0.007)  (0.004)      (0.008)  (0.004) 
Firmage (log) (t-1)      -0.000  -0.003**      0.000  -0.002 
      (0.000)  (0.001)      (0.001)  (0.002) 
Crisis*Firmage(log) (t-1)      0.001  0.002***      0.000  0.001 
      (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.002)  (0.001) 
F-test:  LogL-positive =  0.03  0.02  0,04  0,58  0.08  0.05  0.14  1.12 
 LogL  negative  (p=0.87)  (p=0.88)  (p=0.84)  (p=0.45)  (p=0.77)  (p=0.82)  (p=0.71)  (p=0.29) 
F-test:  LogL-negative  3.42  2.53  3.48  18.75  5.82  0.65  7.07  72.32 
 +Crisis* LogL-negative=0  (p=0.06)  (p=0.11)  (p=00.6))  (p=0.00)  (p=0.02)  (p=0.01)  (p=0.00)  (p=0.00) 
F-test:  LogL-positive  1.31  4.24  1.09  30.39  26.74  32.25  7.07  277.67 
 +Crisis* LogL-positive=0  (p=0.25)  (p=0.04)  (p=0.30)  (p=0.30)  (p=0.00)  (p=0.01)  (p=0.00)  (p=0.00) 
Year Dummies  X  X      X  X     
Sector-Year Dummies      X  X      X  X 
Province Dummies      X        X   
Number of observations  119,818  119,818  119,818  119,818  119,818  119,818  119,818  119,818 
R2  0.002  0.002  0.011  0.012  0.021  0.024  0.031  0.034 
Adjusted R2  0.002  0.002  0.009  -0.250  0.021  0.024  0.029  -0.222 
Notes:  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by establishment 
OLS Weighted regressions use as weight the average number of blue-collar workers over the period over which the growth is defined, FE Weighted regressions use as 





Table 6: The Evolution of Gender Wage Gaps  
Firm-level Earnings Regressions 
  Blue-Collar Workers  White Collar Workers 
  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable 
  Log average wages blue-collar workers  Log average wages white-collar workers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  OLS  FE  OLS   FE  OLS  FE  OLS   FE 
   coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se 
%Women Blue   -0.358***  -0.176***  -0.144***  -0.069         
  (0.029)  (0.051)  (0.024)  (0.045)         
Crisis* %Women Blue 
BBlueBlueollar  
0.007  -0.021  -0.023  -0.033         
  (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.026)         
%Women White           -0.215***  0.141**  -0.163***  0.008 
          (0.082)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.049) 
Crisis* %Women White 
r 
        0.070  0.053  0.045  0.007 
          (0.074)  (0.054)  (0.062)  (0.049) 
Unskilled Ratio      -0.799***  -1.007***      1.114***  1.932*** 
      (0.051)  (0.064)      (0.060)  (0.099) 
Crisis*Unskilled Ratio      0.127*  0.224***      0.257***  0.206*** 
      (0.074)  (0.064)      (0.086)  (0.068) 
Log L      0.053***  -0.070***      0.043***  -0.138*** 
      (0.006)  (0.017)      (0.010)  (0.028) 
Crisis*Log L      -0.014*  -0.017***      -0.001  0.000 
      (0.008)  (0.007)      (0.012)  (0.009) 
Log (V/L)      0.204***  0.122***      0.259***  0.111*** 
      (0.007)  (0.007)      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Crisis*Log (V/L)      0.017*  0.019**      -0.004  -0.007 
      (0.009)  (0.008)      (0.014)  (0.011) 
Foreign Owned      0.070***  0.011      0.206***  0.020 
      (0.021)  (0.030)      (0.034)  (0.056) 
Crisis*Foreign Owned      0.022  0.001      0.021  0.044 
      (0.028)  (0.025)      (0.038)  (0.032) 
Government Owned      0.035  0.009      -0.043  0.041 
      (0.036)  (0.041)      (0.038)  (0.046) 
Crisis*Government 
Owned 
    -0.005  -0.001      0.033  0.025 
      (0.046)  (0.043)      (0.060)  (0.056) 
Exporter      0.063***  0.028**      0.126***  0.020 
      (0.013)  (0.013)      (0.021)  (0.018) 
Crisis*exporter      -0.023  -0.028      -0.063  -0.043 
      (0.026)  (0.021)      (0.040)  (0.027) 
Firm age (log)      0.018*  0.103***      0.010  0.117*** 
      (0.010)  (0.026)      (0.017)  (0.043) 
Crisis*Firmage (log)       0.017  0.010      0.034*  0.008 
      (0.012)  (0.010)      (0.019)  (0.015) 
Log Minimum Wage      0.022  0.037      -0.021  -0.015 
      (0.050)  (0.045)      (0.079)  (0.073) 
Crisis*Log Minimum 
Wage 
    -0.164**  -0.111*      0.019  0.038 
      (0.065)  (0.058)      (0.105)  (0.088) 
Year Dummies  X  X      X  X     
Sector-Year Dummies      X  X      X  X 
Province Dummies      X        X   
N  138,133  138,133  138,133  138,133  138,133  138,133  138,133  138,133 
R2  0.059  0.107  0.366  0.184  0.010  0.028  0.311  0.156 
Adjusted R2  0.059  0.107  0.365  0.183  0.010  0.028  0.310  0.154 
Notes:  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by establishment 
OLS Weighted regressions use as weight the average number of blue-collar workers over the period over which the growth is defined, FE Weighted regressions use as 
weights the average number of blue-collar workers over the entire period   40 
 
Appendix A: Examining the representativeness of our findings using SAKERNAS 
This appendix contains an analysis of gender differences in the impact of the East Asian crisis on 
manufacturing wages and employment using SAKERNAS – a nationally representative labor force 
survey. This analysis complements the firm-level analysis presented in the main body of the text and 
helps assess the representativeness of the results obtained.   
The SAKERNAS data contain detailed information on individual‘s gender, age, education, 
occupation and earnings. Yet, we cannot match individual workers to firms in the census. Moreover, 
while  SAKERNAS  enables  us  to  identify  which  individuals  are  employed  in  manufacturing, 
information on firm-size is lacking. Thus the sample of manufacturing workers in SAKERNAS 
contains not only employees of firms observed in the SI data (that is, firms with more than 20 
employees),  but also many individuals who work  in  very small  manufacturing  firms,  allowing a 
comparison of the entire manufacturing sector with the larger, more formal firms covered by the 
manufacturing census. 
A.1 Employment adjustment 
Figure  A1  depicts  the  evolution  of  aggregate  employment  and  manufacturing  employment, 
separately for men and women. The crises only induced a small change in overall employment 
(consistent with the patterns discussed in Sections 2 and 5) and the differences between men and 
women were not large. Post-crisis, aggregate employment rates dropped, but by slightly more for 
women than for men. The evolution of manufacturing employment is more volatile and it appears as 
though  the  crisis  induced  a  substantial  reduction  in  manufacturing  employment,  and  that  this 
reduction  was  slightly  larger  for  men  than  for  women.  Post-crisis,  manufacturing  employment 
rebounded,  and men‘s manufacturing  employment grew more quickly  than women‘s.  Note  that 
these  trends  are  not  strictly  comparable  to  those  observed  using  the  SI-data,  which  do  not 
demonstrate an increase in the number of manufacturing jobs. Part of the reason might have to do 
with the fact that the SI data only covers large manufacturing firms; it may be the case that the 
number of small  manufacturing  firms has risen  rapidly (perhaps partly reflecting an increase  in 
informality in response to decreasing labor market flexibility due to more stringent labor laws).   
A.2 Wage Adjustment 
Figure A2 depicts the evolution of average wages and average manufacturing wages for men and 
women separately using SAKERNAS data. These trends are consistent with those observed using 
the  SI-data  as  both  men‘s  and  women‘s  real  wages  fell  precipitously  during  the  crisis  in 
manufacturing and in other sectors. However, in contrast with the findings obtained using the SI 
data, men‘s average real manufacturing earnings appear to have fallen more than women‘s. 
  To  assess  whether  the  gender  wage  gap  indeed  closed,  we  estimate  standard  Mincerian 
equations  that  mimic  the  firm-level  specifications  presented  in  Section  7.  That  is  we  estimate 
equations of the form: 41 
 
                                                                           
 Where      is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the individual and    is a vector of 
individual-specific  characteristics,  include  their  age  and  education,  and      is  an  error  term.     
provides a measure of the gender wage gap, while            tells us by how much the gender wage 
gap changed during the crisis. These equations are estimated separately for blue-collar and white-
collar workers.  
  The results are presented in Table A1.  The dependent variable is real monthly earnings. 
Column 1 only includes a gender dummy and its interaction with the crisis dummy and a control for 
the number of hours worked, as well as province year dummies. Column 2 adds age, age squared 
and dummies for educational attainment. Column 3 interacts these with crisis dummies. Columns 4, 
5 and 6 repeat specifications 1, 2 and 3 respectively, for white-collar workers. 
  The raw gender premium in manufacturing is roughly 28% for blue-collar workers and 30% 
for white-collar workers. Controlling for age and education reduces these premia to 19% and 21% 
respectively. Note that these premia are similar to the ones obtained using the firm-level average 
wages  (see  Section  7).  The  crisis-gender  interaction  dummy  is  negative  but  never  statistically 
significant for blue-collar workers, suggesting that women suffered more adverse wage losses even 
though we cannot reject the null that the gender wage gap did not shrink during the crisis (note that 
that the estimates imply that women‘s wages dropped by 4.9% more than men‘s wages; this number 
is  strikingly  similar  to  the  estimates  of  the  widening  of  gender  pay  gaps  by  approximately  4% 
obtained with the firm-level data). For white-collar workers it is positive and significant if education 
and  age  are  not controlled  for.  Once  individual  characteristics  are  controlled  for,  however,  the 
interaction of gender with the crisis dummy becomes insignificant. Thus, the null hypothesis that the 
gender-wage gaps for both blue-collar and white-collar workers did not change during the crisis 
cannot be rejected.   
These results are consistent with those obtained using the SI data. While the gender wage 
gap in the SI increased on average, the increase in the wage gap was positively correlated with firm 
size. Women in the smallest SI firms experienced a reduction in the gender wage gap.  Consequently, 
it should perhaps not come as a surprise that once we include employees of firms with fewer than 20 
employees in our sample, the average wage gap is reduced.  
  Overall, then, the results obtained using the SAKERNAS dataset corroborate the results 
obtained using the SI data. 
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Table A1 – Earnings Regressions based on SAKERNAS Data 
Mincerian Earnings Regressions (OLS) 
Dependent variable: log real monthly income 
  Blue-collar Workers  White-collar Workers 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se 
Female  -0.284***  -0.187***  -0.188***  -0.304***  -0.217***  -0.213*** 
  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Crisis*female  -0.049  -0.047  -0.046  0.066*  0.055  0.037 
  (0.037)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.030) 
Hours(log)  0.574***  0.542***  0.546***  0.362***  0.345***  0.326*** 
  (0.047)  (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.073)  (0.056)  (0.046) 
Age    0.039***  0.039***    0.047***  0.050*** 
    (0.003)  (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Age2    -0.000***  -0.000***    -0.000***  -0.000*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Primary     0.257***  0.261***    0.294***  0.309*** 
    (0.018)  (0.026)    (0.023)  (0.027) 
Secondary    0.474***  0.471***    0.593***  0.591*** 
    (0.025)  (0.031)    (0.027)  (0.029) 
Tertiary    0.885***  0.919***    1.146***  1.134*** 
    (0.078)  (0.069)    (0.035)  (0.036) 
Crisis*Hours(log)      -0.014      0.080 
      (0.059)      (0.126) 
Crisis*Age      0.001      -0.011 
      (0.008)      (0.011) 
Crisis*Age2      -0.000      0.000 
      (0.000)      (0.000) 
Crisis*Primary       -0.015      -0.066 
      (0.061)      (0.075) 
Crisis*Secondary      0.012      0.012 
      (0.064)      (0.058) 
Crisis*Tertiary      -0.154      0.081 
      (0.178)      (0.096) 
Province Dummies  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Year Dummies  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Number of observations  21,883  21,883  21,883  20,162  20,162  20,162 
R2  0.354  0.442  0.443  0.268  0.470  0.471 
Adjusted R2  0.353  0.441  0.441  0.266  0.469  0.470 
Notes: 
  ***  p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1, Robust standard errors are clustered by kabupaten/walikota (district/town).   
Regressions  are  weighted  by  sample  weights  unless  otherwise  noted.  Sample  is  restricted  to  actively  working 
manufacturing  wage  earners  between  ages  of  15  and  70.  Reference  category  for  education  dummies  is  no  or 
uncompleted primary education. 
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Appendix B: Data Appendix 
B.1 Construction of panel 
Survei  Industri  (SI)  from  Indonesia‘s  statistical  bureau  (Badan  Pusat  Statistik—BPS)  provides  the 
plant-level data used in this paper. The SI is an annual census of all manufacturing establishments with more 
than 20 employees.36  While the annual survey has been conducted going back to 1975, field procedures for 
identifying new firms were dramatically improved over 1985-1990, making the accuracy of measuring entry 
prior to 1990 problematic (see Aswicahyono, 2008).  Moreover, the dataset does not consistently differentiate 
male versus female blue-collar or white-collar workers prior to 1993, so as a result, this paper only considers 
the data post 1993. We use data up until 2004, since data from later years are not immediately comparable due 
to changes in firm identifiers, changing definitions of key explanatory variables, and province splits.  
B.2 Construction of Key Explanatory Variables 
Sector 
Sector  of  main  product  In  order  to  classify  establishments  by  industry,  BPS  records  the  five-digit 
International  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (ISIC)  for  firms  based  on  the  product  with  the  largest 
production value in any given year.  In 2001, BPS changed the classification of plants from the second 
revision of the ISIC to the third. A consistent bridge between these different coding systems was constructed 
based upon the inclusion of both codings in the dataset for the 2000 survey database. This bridge was 
corroborated using a bridge provided by BPS.  In many cases, the industry code provided in the dataset was 
truncated to four or fewer digits.  Where possible, if an adjacent year‘s reported industry for the same firm 
was available that was used to fill in the truncated digits.   Where plants produce multiple products or the 
production processes allow changing from one product to another, we may expect to see the coded industry 
of production change from year to year.  In such cases, the mode sector code is used (with ties going to the 
initial sector code reported).   
Labor 
Total  labor  for  an  establishment  was  defined  as  the  sum  of  all  paid  and  non-paid  workers,  whether 
production or non-production workers.37  Production workers were defined by BPS as all workers who work 
directly in the production process or activities connected with production process, and non -production 
workers were defined to be all other workers.  These definitions roughly correspond to traditional definitions 
of blue- and white-collar workers, respectively (see below). 
Blue collar workers the sum of all production and unpaid workers.  After 2000, we are unable to distinguish 
paid from unpaid workers in production and non-production occupations, and prior to 2001, we are unable 
to distinguish whether unpaid workers are in production or non-production.  As a result, we do not include 
them in the labor variables prior to 2001, but there is a slight jump in employment as a result of this 
discrepancy in this year. 
                                                           
36 By law, all firms with over 20 employees are required to complete the BPS‘s questionnaire every year. Every ten years 
(1986, 1996, 2006) BPS devotes additional resources to track down all firms to ensure that any firms that had not been 
reporting do so.  A major tracking effort was thus undertaken immediately prior to the crisis, and we can thus be 
reasonably confident that the data are not missing out on a substantial group of non-reporting firms. 
37 Although BPS does not explicitly define it, this is understood to include both permanent and temporary workers. 45 
 
White collar workers: the sum of all non-production workers. 
Unskilled ratio. The unskilled ratio was constructed as the share of blue collar workers (including unpaid 
production workers) as a share of the total establishment employment. 
Share  of  female  workers.  The  share  of  female  workers  (whether  blue  or  white-collar  workers)  is 
constructed, quite simply, by dividing the number of female blue-(white-)collar workers by the total number 
of blue-(white-)collar workers. 
The establishment-level total wage bill was constructed as the sum of cash wages/salary and in-kind benefits 
for blue and white-collar workers deflated to 1993 rupiah using the national consumer price index obtained 
from the World Development Indicators.   
Wages. Wages are defined as the average wage for blue- or white collar workers, constructed as the total 
wage bill for either group divided by the number of workers of either respective group. Real wages are 
constructed by deflating the nominal wage bill reported to BPS by provincial CPI obtained from BPS. 
Minimum wages.  Minimum wages were obtained from BPS as monthly provincial minimum wages set by 
each province (or averages where there is within-province variation across districts) for each year.  These 
reflect the nominal rupiah amount that all formal sector workers are required to be paid at or above.  To 
obtain minimum wages in real terms, we deflated provincial minimum wages by the corresponding provincial 
CPI obtained from BPS. 
Capital and materials 
Capital was defined using the provided estimated value of machinery and equipment for each establishment 
in a given year.  Where the estimated value was not available, the book value was used as provided.  These 
values were deflated to 1993 rupiah values on an annual basis using the reported GDP deflator for machinery 
for  1993-2001  provided  by  BPS  and  using  the  manufacturing  sector  deflator  for  1990-1992.    The 
manufacturing survey does not include data on the value of the capital stock for 1996, so these values were 
interpolated using predicted values constructed from a regression of the capital stock on contemporaneous 
output, material inputs, labour usage, ownership characteristics, whether or not the firm exports, province 
and lagged capital for 1991-1995.  In a separate imputation procedure, we also imputed capital for firms that 
did not report their capital stocks.   
Materials were defined using the total reported value of raw materials used by the firm.  These were deflated 
to 1993 rupiah using a deflator constructed from 2-digit industry GDP deflators weighted by the shares of 
input indicated from input-output tables obtained from the OECD Input-Output Table Database for 1995 
and 2000.   
Value-added and gross output 
Value-added and gross output were calculated by BPS on the basis of the total value of production (and 
net of total expenditure for value added). Both variables were deflated to 1993 rupiah using a 2-digit industry 
level GDP deflator.   
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Firm age was constructed using the difference between the survey year and the year the firm reported the 
start of production.  
Export Status and ownership 
Exporters  were  identified  for  1993-2000  based  upon  reporting  that  the  share  of  output  exported  was 
nonzero and non-missing, and for 2001-2004 based upon a variable identifying whether  any output was 
exported (both variables are not available in the data for all years.)  
Foreign owned firms based upon whether foreign ownership was reported to be non-missing and non-zero.  
Government owned firms were defined the same way based on both local and national government. 
Entry and exit 
Entry is defined as the first year an establishment is observed in the data. Firms may have been in operation 
for several years prior to crossing the minimum threshold of 20 employees to be included in the survey.  
Firm exit is defined as permanent exit from the dataset.   Note that, since the survey only includes firms with 
20 or more employees, firms whose employment falls below this threshold will be defined as having exited in 
case they do not reappear in the data.  There is a spike in exit rates in 2000 that is due partially to economic 
factors (a recession) and data issues that are likely to have been caused by the ―big bang‖ decentralization of 
central government in Indonesia at that time and the splitting off of new provinces that occurred as a result.  
Because the statistics ministry manages its enumerators out of province offices, some anecdotal evidence 
points to the fact that tracking firms became more difficult and may have resulted in spurious exit (see 
Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2010 for a more detailed description). 
B. 3 Cleaning of outliers  
The problem of non-persistent extreme values is recognized in published work using the SI (see for 
example, Blalock, Gertler and Levine,  2008).  In some cases, these values may be the result of key punch 
errors, where, for example, ownership share is recorded as 340 percent rather than 34 percent.  Where shares 
(exports and ownership) were reported, these were easily corrected, but for balance sheet variables, more 
extensive cleaning was required.   
These  likely  key  punch  errors  and  other  highly  volatile  trends  were  corrected  in  the  data  by 
identifying firms with implausibly large non-persistent changes over one or two years and replacing values 
with those of preceding and succeeding years (or just one or the other of the observation was at beginning or 
end of the series). Based on close observation of normal variation of these variables, the thresholds for 
identifying large non-persistent shifts where other variables did not shift as dramatically were a 100% change 
in labor, a 200% in real value added and real output, a 150% change in real inputs, and 100% change in 
capital and average wages.  Next, firms were dropped from the data when they had such a significant number 
of non-persistent jumps that it was impossible to interpolate (this constituted less than 1% of the sample). 
Finally remaining outliers were identified by eyeballing plots of key relationships (e.g. inputs per worker) and 
spot interpolating obvious remaining outliers.   
 